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ABSTRACT
The Western Australian Government stated that the Criminal Property Confiscation

Act 2000 (WA) (‘CPCA’) will provide ‘the strongest and most effective’ confiscation
powers in the world.1 It was observed by the High Court that the CPCA has enabled
a confiscation of property scheme that has a ‘significant impact upon personal and
property rights.’2 Strong powers to fight crime are justified, but it is critical that
these powers are used responsibly and that innocent parties are protected. This
thesis considers the extent to which the objection to confiscation provisions in
Part 6 of the CPCA (‘the protections’) operate to protect the family home of an
‘innocent party’.

Any Act that enables the state to deprive an innocent person of their family home
is a significant piece of legislation demanding a thorough examination.
Surprisingly, this is something which has only occurred to a limited extent in
academic scholarship at this point in time. This thesis will address this shortcoming by providing a thorough overview of the protections for the family homes
of innocent parties from confiscation, identifying issues arising from these
protections and providing commentary on possible amendments to these
protections.

1

Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 29 June 2000, 8611 (Dan
Barron-Sullivan).
2
Mansfield v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) (2006) 226 CLR 486, 491 [5], quoted in
Musikanth, Alain, ‘The Criminal Property Confiscation Act: Acting on Behalf of a Commercial
Client with an Interest in the Asset’ (Paper presented at Continuing Professional Development on
the Seizure of Client’s Assets by the State, Law Society of Western Australia, 18 March 2009) 1.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
The Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000 (WA) (‘CPCA’) is an Act that enables
the State of Western Australia to deprive its citizens of privately-owned assets, ‘a
highly intrusive act of state.’3 The CPCA commenced on January 1, 2001,4 replacing
the Crimes (Confiscation of Profits) Act 1998 (WA) which was believed to be
‘inadequate and outdated legislation.’5 The CPCA, on the other hand, was ‘a new
weapon in the fight against criminal activity’, particularly in relation to organised
crime and the drug trade.6 The Government of the time firmly believed that the
CPCA, ‘will be the strongest and most effective [Act] of its kind in the world.’7

The CPCA departed from the Crimes (Confiscation of Profits) Act 1998 (WA) in a
number of ways.8 The most significant of these reforms was a move from a
conviction based regime to a non-conviction based regime, following a
recommendation of the Australian Law Reform Commission.9 Whereas the Crimes
(Confiscation of Profits) Act 1998 (WA) only allowed confiscation when ‘a person
is convicted of a serious offence’,10 the CPCA allows confiscation to occur even

3

Ben Clarke, ‘A Man’s Home is His Castle- Or Is It? How to Take People’s Homes Without
Convicting them of Anything: The Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000 (WA)’ (2004) 28
Criminal Law Journal 263, 263.
4
Peter Foss, ‘Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000- 68 of 2000’ in Western Australia, Western
Australian Government Gazette, No 285, 29 December 2000, 7901, 7903
5
Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 29 June 2000, 8611 (Dan
Barron-Sullivan).
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
8
For a useful summary of the changes see, Ben Clarke, ‘A Man’s Home is His Castle- Or Is It? How
to Take People’s Homes Without Convicting them of Anything: The Criminal Property Confiscation
Act 2000 (WA)’ (2004) 28 Criminal Law Journal 263, 271-2.
9
Australian Law Reform Commission, Confiscation that Counts: A Review of the Proceeds of Crime
Act 1987, Report No 87 (1999) 84; Stephen Hall and Jeff Scholz, ‘Ill-gotten gains?’ (2000) 27(11)
Brief 6, 8.
10
Crimes (Confiscation of Profits) Act 1998 (WA) s 6(1).
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when no offence has been committed.11 Proceedings under the CPCA are civil,
rather than criminal, which is significant due to the application of a lesser
evidentiary standard (the balance of probabilities) and civil rules of evidence,
which increases the ease by which the State can secure a confiscation.12 This task
is made even easier because the CPCA admits opinion and hearsay evidence on
behalf of the State in certain circumstances.13 Additionally, the onus of proof may
in some situations be reversed, so the individual must establish the property was
lawfully acquired.14

The intention of the CPCA is to enable ‘confiscation of proceeds of criminal activity
and property used in criminal activity.’15 Section 4 of the CPCA provides five bases
of confiscation to achieve this objective.16 The first is unexplained wealth, which
occurs when ‘the total value of a person’s wealth exceeds the value of the person’s
lawfully acquired wealth’.17 Criminal benefits can be confiscated, which refers to
‘property, services, advantages and benefits obtained by a person who has been
involved in the commission of a confiscation offence’.18 Thirdly, property that is
crime-used, which is ‘property used in or in connection with commission of a

11

See, eg, CPCA ss 4(a), 5(2)(c).
CPCA s 102; Natalie Skead and Sarah Murray, ‘The Politics of Proceeds of Crime Legislation’
(2015) 38(2) University of New South Wales Law Journal 455, 465.
13
CPCA s 105.
14
See, eg, CPCA ss 12(2), 82(1), 83(1).
15
Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 29 June 2000, 8611 (Dan
Barron-Sullivan).
16
See also Joseph McGrath, ‘Responding on Behalf of a Client whose Assets are Frozen by the
State: Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000’ (Paper presented at Continuing Professional
Development on the Seizure of Client’s Assets by the State, Law Society of Western Australia, 18
March 2009) 3.
17
CPCA s 4(a).
18
CPCA s 4(b).
12
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confiscation offence’19 is confiscable. Crime-derived property can be confiscated,
which is ‘property derived directly or indirectly from the commission of a
confiscation offence’.20 The final type of property that may be confiscated is
property that is or was owned by a declared drug trafficker.21 In relation to crimeused property, a secondary base of confiscation exists when the crime-used
property is not available for confiscation.22 This is known as crime-used property
substitution and enables confiscation of property equal in value to the crime-used
property from the respondent.23 As drug trafficker and crime-used property
confiscation are the most commonly used grounds of confiscation, these bases will
be the primary focus of this thesis.24

Despite the ‘significant impact of the legislation upon personal and property
rights’,25 the CPCA has received little scholarly attention. Existing scholarly work
is focused on the various bases of confiscation described above.26 The impact of
confiscation on innocent parties, such as the innocent wife who has the family

19

CPCA s 4(c).
CPCA s 4(d).
21
CPCA s 4(e).
22
CPCA s 22.
23
CPCA s 23(1).
24
Edward Greaves, ‘Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000: Crime-Used and Crime- Derived
Cases’ (Paper presented at Legalwise Seminar, 20 November 2015) 1.
25
Mansfield v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) (2006) 226 CLR 486, 491 [5], quoted in
Musikanth, Alain, ‘The Criminal Property Confiscation Act: Acting on Behalf of a Commercial
Client with an Interest in the Asset’ (Paper presented at Continuing Professional Development on
the Seizure of Client’s Assets by the State, Law Society of Western Australia, 18 March 2009) 1.
26
See, eg, Natalie Skead, 'Crime-used Property Confiscation in Western Australia and the
Northern Territory: Laws Befitting Draco’s Axones?' (2016) 41(1) University of Western Australia
Law Journal 67; Natalie Skead, ‘Drug-trafficker Property Confiscation Schemes in Western
Australia and the Northern Territory: A Study in Legislation going too far’ (2013) 37 Criminal Law
Journal 296; Natalie Skead, ‘Unexplained Wealth: Indefeasibility and Proceeds of Crime
Legislation in Australia Carruthers’ in Penny Carruthers, Sharon Mascher and Natalie Skead (eds),
Property and Sustainability: Selected Essays (Thomson Reuters Australia, 2011).
20
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home confiscated as a result of her husband’s drug trafficking, has escaped
significant scrutiny.27 The potential for the CPCA to produce this outcome was
acknowledged by the Western Australian Parliament and provisions were included
in the CPCA to protect innocent parties from these ‘unjust consequences’ (‘the
protections’).28 As the CPCA has been described as ‘perplexing and difficult to
construe’,29 lacking ‘coherence’ and being ‘drafted unsatisfactorily’,30 the mere
existence of these protections is unlikely to provide significant reassurance to an
innocent party.

This thesis will seek to examine these protections by considering the following four
questions; firstly, how is an innocent party defined by the CPCA, secondly, what is
the scope of the protections available to protect the family home of an innocent
party, thirdly, what issues have arisen from these protections and fourthly, how
these protections may be improved. Currently there are no secondary sources
that directly address these research questions. These questions are of critical
importance as depriving citizens of privately-owned assets is a ‘highly intrusive act

27

Natalie Skead, ‘Drug-trafficker Property Confiscation Schemes in Western Australia and the
Northern Territory: A Study in Legislation going too far’ (2013) 37 Criminal Law Journal 296, 296.
28
Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 29 June 2000, 8613 (Dan
Barron-Sullivan).
29
Centurion Trust Company Ltd v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) (2010) 201 A Crim R 324,
343 [75] (Owen JA) (‘Centurion’), quoted in Edward Greaves, ‘Criminal Property Confiscation Act
2000: Crime-Used and Crime- Derived Cases’ (Paper presented at Legalwise Seminar, 20
November 2015) 2.
30
Transcript of Proceedings, Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Centurion Trust Company Ltd
[2011] HCATrans 88 (8 April 2011), quoted in Edward Greaves, ‘Criminal Property Confiscation
Act 2000: Crime-Used and Crime- Derived Cases’ (Paper presented at Legalwise Seminar, 20
November 2015) 2.
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of state’.31 This is particularly so when the asset in question is the home of
innocent people, who are ‘innocent’ not just in a general sense, but as defined by
the Act that enables the confiscation.32 By focussing on these four questions, a
thorough overview of the protections for the family home of innocent parties will
be provided, as well as a consideration of the significant issues arising from the
protections and recommendations for improving the operation of the protections.
Due to the vast scope of potential hypothetical issues that could be considered in
relation to the protections, this thesis will be focused on issues that have emerged
from the case law to date.33

Although it is acknowledged that a number of issues exist in relation to the
confiscation powers contained in the CPCA, this thesis will not be addressing these
issues.34

This thesis is focused on the protections, and any proposed

improvements will be in relation to the protections, not to the confiscation
powers.35 These improvements will focus on ensuring that the protections are
coherent and consistent, as opposed to radically changing the CPCA. Additionally,

31

Ben Clarke, ‘A Man’s Home is His Castle- Or Is It? How to Take People’s Homes Without
Convicting them of Anything: The Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000 (WA)’ (2004) 28
Criminal Law Journal 263, 263.
32
This definition will be discussed in chapter four.
33
An example of a hypothetical issue is found in Ben Clarke, ‘A Man’s Home is His Castle- Or Is It?
How to Take People’s Homes Without Convicting them of Anything: The Criminal Property
Confiscation Act 2000 (WA)’ (2004) 28 Criminal Law Journal 263, 269-70.
34
Examples of these issues include the constitutional validity of the drug trafficker confiscation
scheme and the scope of the crime-used property definition. On these issues see Natalie Skead,
‘Drug-trafficker Property Confiscation Schemes in Western Australia and the Northern Territory:
A Study in Legislation going too far’ (2013) 37 Criminal Law Journal 296, 306-12 and Natalie
Skead, 'Crime-used Property Confiscation in Western Australia and the Northern Territory: Laws
Befitting Draco’s Axones?' (2016) 41(1) University of Western Australia Law Journal 67, 69-72.
35
This is largely due to the fact that the confiscation powers have attracted some scholarly
attention, while the protections have received only brief consideration.
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the definition of ‘innocent party’ that is provided in the CPCA will not be critically
evaluated. The question of how to define innocence, particularly in the context of
a non-conviction based confiscation scheme, is philosophically complex and
beyond the scope of this thesis.

Before considering the research questions, literature relevant to the topic will first
be considered and critiqued, with any gaps in the literature being identified.
Chapter three will then consider why a traditional research methodology will be
adopted for this thesis.

This will involve a discussion of the research

methodologies utilitised by previous authors on the CPCA and the strengths and
weaknesses of these approaches. These approaches will then be compared to the
methodology to be applied in this thesis, which will also be critically assessed.
Chapters four to seven will then consider the four questions in the order stated
above. The final chapter will contain a conclusion on the findings of this thesis.

Any Act that potentially enables the state to deprive an innocent person of their
family home is an exceptional piece of legislation that demands a thorough
examination. This thesis will perform this examination, clarifying to what extent
the family home of an innocent party is protected under the CPCA, as well as
observing issues with the protections and recommendations for improvements.

12

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
I.

INTRODUCTION

There are very few secondary sources that address the CPCA. The only authors
who have produced peer reviewed literature that considers innocent parties
under the CPCA are Dr Natalie Skead and Dr Ben Clarke. The limited scholarship
in this area is acknowledged by Skead who writes, ‘there is little scholarship on the
impact of the legislation on the property rights of defendants, and more
importantly, innocent third parties.’36 As the literature by Clarke is dated and only
addresses the research question in passing, this review will focus primarily on the
work of Skead. In addition to being the most relevant, her work is also the most
recent and the most extensive.

The remaining sources considered by this

literature review are non-peer reviewed papers by Mr Edward Greaves, Mr Joseph
McGrath, Mr Alain Musikanth and Mr Michael Seaman.

II.

DEFINING INNOCENT PARTIES

Although every source acknowledges the possible adverse ramifications of the
CPCA on innocent parties,37 there is very little scholarship on who an ‘innocent
party’ is under the CPCA. Skead notes that the CPCA does define ‘innocent party’
but does not include the definition or provide any commentary regarding the

36

Natalie Skead, ‘Drug-trafficker Property Confiscation Schemes in Western Australia and the
Northern Territory: A Study in Legislation going too far’ (2013) 37 Criminal Law Journal 296, 296.
37
See, eg, Joseph McGrath, ‘Responding on Behalf of a Client whose Assets are Frozen by the
State: Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000’ (Paper presented at Continuing Professional
Development on the Seizure of Client’s Assets by the State, Law Society of Western Australia, 18
March 2009) 21 (written prior to his Honour’s appointment to the Supreme Court of Western
Australia).
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definition.38 This is due to the definition in the CPCA being in reference to crimeused and crime-derived property only, while Skead’s chapter focuses on
unexplained wealth. However, her work would have been complemented by a
consideration of the definition, as the ‘innocent party’ criteria most likely still
applies to unexplained wealth declarations, as Skead herself acknowledges.39
Greaves observes that the definition provided in sections 153(3) and (4) of the
CPCA draws on well-known principles of property law and as a result requires little
further explanation.40 This is a reasonable conclusion, however the definition
provided in sections 153(1) and (2) does not have an equivalent level of clarity.41
The definition of ‘innocent party’ is critical as it is central to a number of the
protections contained in the CPCA. As the literature indicates a clear awareness
of the possible issues for innocent parties, it is surprising that the definition in the
CPCA is usually overlooked and in the rare instances when it is noted, is passed
over very briefly.42

38

Natalie Skead, ‘Unexplained Wealth: Indefeasibility and Proceeds of Crime Legislation in
Australia Carruthers’ in Penny Carruthers, Sharon Mascher and Natalie Skead (eds), Property and
Sustainability: Selected Essays (Thomson Reuters Australia, 2011) 215.
39
Ibid 216.
40
Edward Greaves, ‘Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000: Crime-Used and Crime- Derived
Cases’ (Paper presented at Legalwise Seminar, 20 November 2015) 17-8. These principles being
the concept of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice.
41
Greaves does briefly discuss the case of Lambert v Western Australia (2014) 240 A Crim R 268
in which the spouse of a drug trafficker objected to the confiscation of the family home on the
grounds that she was an innocent party, see Edward Greaves, ‘Criminal Property Confiscation Act
2000: Crime-Used and Crime- Derived Cases’ (Paper presented at Legalwise Seminar, 20
November 2015) 18.
42
See, eg, Joseph McGrath, ‘Responding on Behalf of a Client whose Assets are Frozen by the
State: Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000’ (Paper presented at Continuing Professional
Development on the Seizure of Client’s Assets by the State, Law Society of Western Australia, 18
March 2009) 12.
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III.

PROTECTIONS AVAILABLE TO INNOCENT PARTIES

Part 6 of the CPCA contains provisions that enable property to be released if
certain criteria are satisfied.43 Of particular relevance are sections 82, 83 and 87,
which specifically refer to innocent parties, while section 84 provides a general
objection provision that is indirectly relevant.

Sections 82 and 83 are similar provisions that provide for the release of crime-used
and crime-derived property respectively.

Lamers v Western Australia44

is

discussed by a number of authors to illustrate how strictly the hardship provision
in section 82(3) is applied by the court.45 In this case, the family home was
confiscated as a result of a drug trafficker declaration. Notably the hardship
provision only applies to crime-used property, a feature that has escaped any
detailed attention in the literature.46

43

For a summary of the various criteria, see Appendix 1. In the context of sections 82, 83 and 84
the property is ‘released’ in the sense that the freezing notice or freezing order is set aside. In
relation to section 87, the property is released by the making of a court order for the release of
the confiscated property (CPCA s 87(1)).
44
(2009) 192 A Crim R 471.
45
Natalie Skead, 'Crime-used Property Confiscation in Western Australia and the Northern
Territory: Laws Befitting Draco’s Axones?' (2016) 41(1) University of Western Australia Law
Journal 67, 78-81; Edward Greaves, ‘Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000: Crime-Used and
Crime- Derived Cases’ (Paper presented at Legalwise Seminar, 20 November 2015) 14-21;
Michael Seaman, ‘Recent Developments in Respect to the Criminal Property Confiscation Act
2000’ (Paper presented at Continuing Professional Development on the Seizure of Client’s Assets
by the State, Law Society of Western Australia, 18 March 2009) 5.
46
Edward Greaves, ‘Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000: Crime-Used and Crime- Derived
Cases’ (Paper presented at Legalwise Seminar, 20 November 2015) 20; Michael Seaman, ‘Recent
Developments in Respect to the Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000’ (Paper presented at
Continuing Professional Development on the Seizure of Client’s Assets by the State, Law Society
of Western Australia, 18 March 2009) 5.
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For a release to be granted under section 87, the applicant must meet five criteria.
The final criterion, that any other owner must also be an innocent party in relation
to the property, significantly limits the protection available to an innocent party.
Skead and Clarke both agree that this condition results in a number of difficulties
and inequities.47 Skead provides a useful case study of this issue using Director of
Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Le.48

The final relevant section to innocent parties is section 84, which has attracted
significant attention.49 Skead’s 2011 article is of particular value and represents
the most detailed analysis of any of the protections in the CPCA. Skead argues
that the assistance provided by section 84 is limited and inadequate.50 This is
because if a property is frozen as it is subject to confiscation, innocent parties are
prevented from dealing with the property. Dealing with frozen property is a

47

Natalie Skead, ‘Unexplained Wealth: Indefeasibility and Proceeds of Crime Legislation in
Australia Carruthers’ in Penny Carruthers, Sharon Mascher and Natalie Skead (eds), Property and
Sustainability: Selected Essays (Thomson Reuters Australia, 2011) 216-7; Ben Clarke, ‘A Man’s
Home is His Castle- Or Is It? How to Take People’s Homes Without Convicting them of Anything:
The Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000 (WA)’ (2004) 28 Criminal Law Journal 263, 269.
48
(2007) 232 CLR 562; Natalie Skead, 'Crime-used Property Confiscation in Western Australia and
the Northern Territory: Laws Befitting Draco’s Axones?' (2016) 41(1) University of Western
Australia Law Journal 67, 73-4.
49
Alain Musikanth, ‘The Criminal Property Confiscation Act: Acting on Behalf of a Commercial
Client with an Interest in the Asset’ (Paper presented at Continuing Professional Development on
the Seizure of Client’s Assets by the State, Law Society of Western Australia, 18 March 2009) 9;
Natalie Skead, ‘Unexplained Wealth: Indefeasibility and Proceeds of Crime Legislation in Australia
Carruthers’ in Penny Carruthers, Sharon Mascher and Natalie Skead (eds), Property and
Sustainability: Selected Essays (Thomson Reuters Australia, 2011) 211-2; Natalie Skead, ‘Drugtrafficker Property Confiscation Schemes in Western Australia and the Northern Territory: A
Study in Legislation going too far’ (2013) 37 Criminal Law Journal 296, 304; Natalie Skead and
Sarah Murray, ‘The Politics of Proceeds of Crime Legislation’ (2015) 38(2) University of New South
Wales Law Journal 455, 483.
50
Natalie Skead, ‘Unexplained Wealth: Indefeasibility and Proceeds of Crime Legislation in
Australia Carruthers’ in Penny Carruthers, Sharon Mascher and Natalie Skead (eds), Property and
Sustainability: Selected Essays (Thomson Reuters Australia, 2011) 211.

16

serious offence unless the offender did not know or could not reasonably have
known that the property was frozen.51 ‘Deal’ is defined broadly in section 151 of
the CPCA to cover most conceivable actions in relation to property. Skead52 cites
Permanent Trustee Co Ltd v Western Australia53 and Permanent Custodians Ltd v
Western Australia54 as examples of the inadequacy of these provisions for an
innocent party, albeit parties with a commercial interest in property.

Despite common agreement amongst the authors about the risks the CPCA poses
for innocent parties, there is very little literature on the scope of the protections
the CPCA provides generally, and for the family home specifically. It is only the
work of Skead, particularly her 2011, 2013 and 2016 works, and the work of
Greaves that goes beyond a superficial commentary of the issues and discusses
some of the protections provided by the CPCA in detail. Beyond the work of Skead
and Greaves, the remaining secondary sources are of little relevance to the
research questions. Despite the significant value of the work by Skead and
Greaves, these contributions are still limited due to their focus on a particular
confiscation power, rather than focussing on innocent parties and considering the
protections as a whole. This is a significant gap in the research and as a result it is
difficult to make any comment about the extent of the protections in the CPCA.

51

CPCA ss 50(1), 50(3).
Natalie Skead, ‘Unexplained Wealth: Indefeasibility and Proceeds of Crime Legislation in
Australia Carruthers’ in Penny Carruthers, Sharon Mascher and Natalie Skead (eds), Property and
Sustainability: Selected Essays (Thomson Reuters Australia, 2011) 211-12; Natalie Skead and
Sarah Murray, ‘The Politics of Proceeds of Crime Legislation’ (2015) 38(2) University of New South
Wales Law Journal 455, 483.
53
(2002) 26 WAR 1.
54
[2006] WASC 225 (29 September 2006).
52
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IV.

CONCLUSION

The lack of protection for innocent parties is an issue that has been observed in
the literature but not addressed in great depth. As demonstrated, the existing
literature deals only with protections available to innocent parties in specific
circumstances and in limited detail. There is simply no literature that provides
any sort of overview of the protections available to innocent parties from the
confiscation powers contained in the CPCA or any consideration of how these
protections apply to the family home. The absence of detailed consideration of
the definition of ‘innocent party’ is indicative of the limited scholarship in this area.
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
I.

INTRODUCTION

The topic being addressed is to what extent do the objection provisions contained
in Part 6 of the CPCA protect the family home of an 'innocent party' from
confiscation? This topic will consider the following four research questions; how
is an innocent party defined by the CPCA, what is the scope of the protections
available to protect the family home of an innocent party, what issues have arisen
from these protections and how these protections may be improved. There are
no secondary sources that directly address these research questions.

The

secondary sources that do indirectly address the research questions all adopt a
traditional ‘black-letter’ law approach, such as Skead55 and Greaves.56 These
sources seek to derive principles from the legislation and the decided cases,
making the traditional approach the appropriate methodology. As the goal of this
research is to provide a comprehensive overview of the protections provided in
the CPCA in relation to the family home of an innocent party, it is appropriate that
this research also adopts this traditional approach.

55

See, eg, Natalie Skead, ‘Unexplained Wealth: Indefeasibility and Proceeds of Crime Legislation
in Australia Carruthers’ in Penny Carruthers, Sharon Mascher and Natalie Skead (eds), Property
and Sustainability: Selected Essays (Thomson Reuters Australia, 2011).
56
Edward Greaves, ‘Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000: Crime-Used and Crime- Derived
Cases’ (Paper presented at Legalwise Seminar, 20 November 2015).
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II.

THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH

The traditional approach, often called ‘black-letter law’ or the doctrinal approach,
focuses on ‘deriving principles and values from decided cases and re-assembling
decided cases into a coherent framework.’57 Accordingly, this traditional approach
relies heavily on legislation and case law. As this thesis is an analysis of legislation
and its application, the traditional approach is the most appropriate. This thesis
will consider the definition of innocent party and the extent of the protections
available to protect the family home of an innocent party by considering the
relevant sections of the legislation, which will include a discussion of relevant case
law and legislative materials. The consideration of the issues that have arisen from
these protections and possible improvements will then be considered primarily by
reference to case law, using legislative materials and secondary sources as
required.

It is acknowledged that the traditional approach has been criticised for being
inward-looking and failing to understand the operation of law in society.58 It is
also limited in that it can only serve as a general guide that needs to be applied to
a particular set of facts. Non-traditional research seeks to overcome these issues
by incorporating other disciplines,59 and in so doing considers the law in a broader
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Mike McConvill and Wing Hong Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University,
2007) 1.
58
Ibid 4-5.
59
Such as sociology, political science and economics, see Mike McConvill and Wing Hong Chui
(eds), Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University, 2007) 5.
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social and political context.60 Some non-traditional methods, such as interviewing
innocent parties may provide some insight, particularly as the majority of
confiscation objections do not proceed to a hearing,61 but such a method would
require a considerable investment of resources with no guarantee of adding
significant value to the thesis. Despite the limitations of the traditional
methodology, and the potential benefits of non-traditional methods, on balance
it is considered that the traditional methodology is the appropriate tool with which
to address these research questions.

Although the use of the traditional research methodology is common in the
literature, this thesis will be novel as a result of its focus and scope. Despite all
secondary sources acknowledging the potential injustice that could occur for
innocent parties as a result of the CPCA, there are no sources that provide a
detailed analysis of the protections from confiscation available to innocent parties.
As the CPCA enables property to be confiscated under five main heads, the
majority of secondary literature is focussed on one or two of these particular
heads. There are numerous examples of this approach, such as the work of
Skead62 and Greaves,63 which provides two examples in relation to crime-used
property.
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Edward Greaves, ‘Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000: Drug Trafficker Cases’ (Paper
presented at Legalwise Seminar, 26 March 2015) 4.
62
Natalie Skead, ‘Crime-used Property Confiscation in Western Australia and the Northern
Territory: Laws Befitting Draco’s Axones?’ (2016) 41(1) University of Western Australia Law
Journal 67.
63
Edward Greaves, ‘Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000: Crime-Used and Crime- Derived
Cases’ (Paper presented at Legalwise Seminar, 20 November 2015) 3.
61

21

This approach is problematic to the extent that there is no research that identifies
common problems across the protections and no commentary regarding the
protections as a whole. Rather, the secondary sources deal with the protections
in isolation, which is valuable in relation to that particular protection, but of little
assistance in determining the scope of the protections as a whole. As this thesis
is not focussing on a particular confiscation power, but rather focusses on
innocent parties, it will be a new contribution to the field. This focus on innocent
parties provides a framework to the thesis and avoids the often piecemeal
approach to this issue evident in the secondary sources to this point.

The distinction between descriptive and analytical research is a relevant one to
this research topic. Descriptive research seeks to describe the state of affairs as it
exists at the present, while analytical research seeks to use the facts or
information available to make a critical evaluation of the material.64 This thesis
will do both, as chapters four and five will describe the state of affairs in relation
to innocent parties and the protections available to them through an analysis of
the legislation and case law. Chapters five and six will then examine issues that
have arisen from the protections and provide suggestions to address these issues.
To adopt the slightly different language of Bell, this thesis will seek to answer both
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C R Kothari, Research Methodology: Methods and Techniques (New Age Publishers, 2nd ed,
2004) 2-3.
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analytical and normative questions. Analytical questions attempt to define the
legal rules, while normative questions address what the law should be.65

III.

CONCLUSION

The traditional research approach is an appropriate methodology to adopt for this
thesis. It is the same methodology adopted by the secondary sources, which is
unsurprising, as this literature also seeks to clarify the law on the topic by analysis
of the legislation and case law.

The contribution of the thesis to existing

scholarship arises from a consideration of the CPCA as a whole with regard to the
protections available for the family home of an innocent party. This holistic
approach will address significant gaps regarding the protections for innocent
parties in the scholarship to date.

65

John Bell, ‘Legal Research and the Distinctiveness of Comparative Law’ in Mark Van Hoecke
(ed), Methodologies of Legal Research (Hart, Oxford, 2011) 157.
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CHAPTER FOUR: DEFINING INNOCENT PARTIES
I.

INTRODUCTION

In order to determine the scope of the protections for innocent parties contained
in the CPCA, it is essential to firstly determine who exactly is an ‘innocent party’.
This chapter seeks to explain the scope of this definition, firstly by reference to the
CPCA itself, and secondly by considering how the definition has been applied by
the judiciary. This definition is critical, as a number of the protections depend on
the person making the objection fulfilling the innocent party definition.

II.

INNOCENT PARTY

Section 153 of the CPCA defines an ‘innocent party’. The definition has four
subsections, subsections one to three relate to crime-used property, while
subsection four relates to crime-derived property.

A. Sections 153(1) and (2)
Section 153(1) provides that an innocent party in relation to crime-used property
is a person who was not involved in the offence and did not know, and had no
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the relevant confiscation offence was
being or would be committed, or took all reasonable steps to prevent its
commission. It is directed towards circumstances where the relevant criminal act
was committed on the property.66 Under section 153(2), also in relation to crimeused property, a person is an innocent party if that party did not know, and had
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Stribrny v Western Australia [2015] WASC (22 October 2015) [59] (Tottle J).
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no reasonable grounds for suspecting that the property was being or would be
used in the commission of the offence; or took all reasonable steps to prevent the
use of the property in the commission of the offence. In contrast to section 153(1),
section 153(2) is directed at circumstances where the property was used in, or in
connection with, the relevant offence.67

A simple application of sections 153(1) and 153(2) of the CPCA is found in Powell
v The State of Western Australia.68 Mr Powell had pleaded guilty to a number of
drug related offences after a search by police had located 21 cannabis plants and
additional cannabis material69 in a shed on the property. Cannabis was also found
in the master bedroom and on a table on the porch of the residence. 70 Ms
Murphy, Mr Powell’s de facto partner, was found not to be an innocent party as
she knew the relevant confiscation offence was being committed on the property
and did not ‘attempt to prevent the commission of the offences or the use of the
property for that purpose’.71
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Stribrny v Western Australia [2015] WASC 396 [59].
[2014] WASC 435 (20 November 2014).
69
Specifically:
two vacuum sealed bags containing 877 g of processed cannabis head, six cannabis
plants (weighing a total of 1.331 kg) in the process of being dried, a further bag
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Powell v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASC 435 (20 November 2014) [3].
70
Ibid.
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B. Sections 153(3) and (4)
Sections 153(3) and (4) of the CPCA both relate to situations where a person has
acquired the property after the property has been crime-used or crime-derived.72
In Greaves’ opinion these subsections provide that a person is an innocent party
in relation to both crime-used and crime-derived property if they are a bona fide
purchaser for value without notice.73 Any transaction that takes place with the
‘intention of avoiding the operation’ of the CPCA is specifically excluded under
both subsections.74 Sections 153(3) and (4) have not been the subject of judicial
consideration.

III.

REASONABLE GROUNDS FOR SUPSECTING

An essential condition in all four subsections is that the person ‘did not know and
had no reasonable grounds for suspecting’.75 An example of how this phrase is
applied is found in Lambert v Western Australia.76 In Lambert the police located
33 plants of cannabis being hydroponically grown in a rear shed in close
proximity to the house by Mr Russell, the partner of Ms Lambert.77 Ms Lambert
contended that she was an innocent party as she was not involved in the
commission of the offence and did not know, and had no reasonable grounds for
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Edward Greaves, ‘Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000: Crime-Used and Crime- Derived
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suspecting that the offence was being committed. As noted by Commissioner
Sleight in Lambert,78 the High Court established in George v Rockett that:
When a statute prescribes that there must be "reasonable grounds" for a state of
mind - including suspicion and belief - it requires the existence of facts which are
sufficient to induce that state of mind in a reasonable person.79

Ms Lambert failed in her application based on the existence of a number of facts,
primarily the elaborate nature of the hydroponic system and its close proximity to
the house.80 The facts made it ‘improbable’ Ms Lambert was not aware of the
drug cultivation.81 As she did not satisfy the innocent party definition, her
objection was dismissed and the family home was confiscated.82

A similar scenario to Lambert occurred in Stribrny v Western Australia.83 Here Mr
Stribrny established an elaborate and sophisticated hydroponic system in the rear
bedrooms of the family home.84 Ms Stribrna, the wife of Mr Stribrny, claimed to
be an innocent party. Justice Tottle accepted the submission that knowledge or
reasonable grounds for suspicion must be made out, ‘in respect of each element
of the relevant confiscation offence or wilful blindness to those elements.’ 85 The
relevant elements in Stribrny were the cultivation of cannabis and an intent to sell
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or supply.86 Based on the existence of a similar set of facts to Lambert, Justice
Tottle was not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that Ms Stribrna did not
know that the property was being used for the cultivation of cannabis 87 and that
she did not have reasonable grounds for suspecting that the cannabis was being
grown with intent to sell or supply to others.88

BJF v The State of Western Australia89 presents an unusual contrast. Here the
husband, Mr F, was convicted of cultivating cannabis, amongst other offences.90
The cultivation occurred in a locked shed located between 10 and 20 metres from
the house.91 There were 17 cannabis plants growing in the shed.92 His wife, Mrs
F, was found to be an innocent party as she was not involved in the commission of
any of the confiscation offences and, ‘did not know, and had no reasonable
grounds to suspect, that any of those offences was being committed.’93 Justice
Murray does not expand any further on the factual basis for making this
determination. In light of Lambert and Stribrny, this conclusion reveals some
inconsistency in how the definition of innocent party is judicially applied. The
decisions in Lambert and Stribrny are respectfully preferred as it is difficult to
accept that the cultivation of drugs using a hydroponic system in a shed close to
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the home would not provide ‘reasonable grounds for suspecting’ the offence was
occurring.

IV.

RELEVANCE TO OTHER BASES OF CONFISCATION

As has been observed, the innocent party definition in section 153 only applies in
relation to crime-used property and crime-derived property. Consequently, its
relevance to property confiscated on the grounds of an unexplained wealth
declaration, a criminal benefits declaration, a drug trafficker declaration or a
crime-used substitution order is unclear. This was noted in Bennett & Co (a firm)
v Director of Public Prosecutions (Western Australia) where it was observed that,
‘an objector is only able to establish that they fall within the deﬁnition of “innocent
party” where the property is either crime-used or crime-derived.’94 This issue will
be considered further in chapters six and seven.

V.

CONCLUSION

The definition of ‘innocent party’ contained in the CPCA only applies when the
property is either crime-used or crime-derived. An innocent person is essentially
a person that did not know and had no reasonable grounds for suspecting that
either the confiscation offence was being or would be committed, the property
was being or would be used in or in connection with the confiscation offence or
the property was crime-used or crime-derived. This is a question of fact to be
determined on the balance of probabilities by considering if facts exist which are
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sufficient to induce suspicion in the mind of a reasonable person. This test is
applied quite consistently by the court, with the case of BJF appearing to be an
exception.
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE PROTECTIONS
I.

INTRODUCTION

The CPCA contains four protections available to innocent parties. These are
contained in sections 82(4), 83(2), 82(3) and 87(1).

Section 84 contains a

protection that does not require a party to be innocent, but nonetheless is of
relevance to innocent parties. The scope of these sections, and application in
protecting the family home of innocent parties is considered in this chapter.

It is important to note that any objections made under sections 82, 83 and 84 must
be filed on or before the 28th day after the service of the freezing notice or
freezing order,95 although the court can allow further time.96 If no objection is
filed within this period, the property will be confiscated.97 Once the property is
confiscated, objections can only occur under section 87. Objections under section
87 must occur ‘within 28 days after the person became aware, or can reasonably
be expected to have become aware, that the property has been confiscated.’98
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CPCA ss 7(1), 79(2), 79(3). This notice should be served on any interested party, see CPCA ss
36(1)(b) and 46(1)(b). An interested party is defined in the glossary to the CPCA as, ‘any person
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II.

CRIME-USED AND CRIME-DERIVED PROPERTY99

Sections 82(4) and 83(2) apply to crime-used and crime-derived property
respectively. Both sections enable the court to set aside a freezing notice or a
freezing order against the interest of an innocent party in a family home providing
a number of conditions are met as considered below.

A. Sections 82(4) and 83(2)
Section 82(4) requires the objector to be able to establish that it is more likely than
not that:
(a)

the objector is the owner of the property, or is one of 2 or more owners
of the property; and

(b)

the property is not effectively controlled by a person who made criminal
use of the property; and

(c)

the objector is an innocent party in relation to the property; and

(d)

each other owner (if there are more than one) is an innocent party in
relation to the property.

Section 83(2) repeats conditions (a), (c) and (d). The only difference is in condition
(b) which provides, ‘the property is not effectively controlled by a person who
wholly or partly derived or realised the property, directly or indirectly, from the
commission of a confiscation offence.’ These conditions are conjunctive and the
burden of proof is on the objector.100 The term ‘owner’ is defined in the glossary
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Journal 67, 80.
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of the CPCA to mean in relation to property, ‘a person who has a legal or equitable
interest in the property.’ As noted by Greaves, this expansive definition allows for
these sections to provide a remedy to people who have an interest in the property,
not just those who are ‘owners’ in the ordinary sense of the word.101

In McLeod v Western Australia102 the second plaintiff (‘the son’), who was the son
of the first plaintiff (‘the father’),103 objected to the confiscation of the home of
which he was the sole registered proprietor, and which his father resided. The
father had pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of, cultivating cannabis and
possessing cannabis with intent to sell or supply it.104 It was not disputed that the
property was crime-used and that the son was an innocent party.105 As conditions
(a) and (c) were not disputed and condition (d) was irrelevant as the son was the
sole owner, condition (b) was the only issue in dispute. Effective control is defined
in section 156(1) of the CPCA:
A person has effective control of property if the person does not have the legal
estate in the property, but the property is directly or indirectly subject to the
control of the person, or is held for the ultimate benefit of the person.106

For a number of reasons, such as the father’s contribution of $117,417.30 towards
the purchase of the property, Justice Jenkins was satisfied that the property was
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subject to the control of the father.107 As condition (b) was not established, the
son’s objection to confiscation failed.

B. Sections 82(5) and 83(3)
Sections 82(5) and 83(3) are substantively identical and provide that if the objector
establishes the matters set out in conditions (a), (b) and (c) but fails to establish
(d), the court may order that when the property is sold, that the objector be paid
an amount equal to the objector’s share in the property.

In Stavrianakos v The State of Western Australia,108 Mr Tony Stavrianakos had
purchased a home from prize money won in the Saturday lotto. Ten years after
purchasing the home, Tony109 was convicted of one count of manufacturing
methylamphetamine

and

one

count

of

attempting

to

manufacture

methylamphetamine at the home.110 His former de facto partner, Ms Lesley
Maxfield and their children, Ms Angie Craven, Mr Nick Stavrianakos and Mr
Jonathan Stavrianakos (the third to sixth plaintiffs) contended that the lotto ticket
was purchased with contributions from all of them and that as a result he held the
prize money on trust for them all.111
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The judgment states that it was ‘common ground’ that the third to sixth plaintiffs
were innocent parties and that the property was not effectively controlled by
Tony.112 There is no explanation as to the reasoning behind this agreement.
Finding that the third to sixth plaintiffs were innocent parties is not surprising as
Angie and Nick never lived at the property and Lesley and Jonathan had vacated
the property by early 2000, more than nine years before the police search. The
agreement that Tony did not effectively control the property may seem unusual
in light of the similarity to the circumstances in McLeod, but as the definition of
effective control in section 156(1) is prescriptive, a person with legal estate in the
property cannot be found to have effective control of the property.

As a result, conditions (b) and (c) of section 82(4) were satisfied. Condition (d)
would not be satisfied as Tony was an owner and not an innocent party.
Therefore, section 82(5) applied, provided that condition (a) is satisfied, namely
that the third to sixth plaintiffs were owners of the property. Justice Tottle found
that Tony held the property on constructive trust for each of the third to sixth
plaintiffs and himself.113 Therefore, Tony and the third to sixth plaintiffs each held
a one-fifth equitable interest in the property. As the term ‘owner’ includes a
person who has an ‘equitable interest in the property’ condition (a) was satisfied.
As a result, section 82(5) applied and Justice Tottle ordered that each of the third
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to sixth plaintiffs be paid an amount equal to one fifth of the net proceeds of sale
of the property, once the outstanding mortgage amount had been satisfied.114

The case of BJF discussed in chapter four provides another example of section
82(5) applying in similar factual circumstances to Stavrianakos. In this case the
innocent party, Mrs F, was entitled to an amount equal to her one-half share as a
joint tenant.115

C. Hardship
Section 82(3) contains a protection aimed specifically at circumstances when the
family home is crime-used. The protection depends on hardship and does not
have an equivalent elsewhere in the CPCA. It is also the only provision that allows
an objector to object to the confiscation of the wrongdoer’s interest in the
property.116 Consequently, in a situation of a family home held by two partners as
joint tenants, it enables the home to be protected from confiscation. In contrast,
all of the other protections do not stop the confiscation and sale of the home, but
only ensure the innocent party is compensated for the value of the confiscated
interest.
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In order for section 82(3) to be satisfied, a number of conditions must all be
fulfilled before a release is granted.117 These conditions restrict the hardship
provision to applications made by an innocent spouse, de facto partner or
dependant who is less than 18 years old.118 The scope of this protection is reduced
further due to criteria (f) and (g), that the objector must suffer undue hardship and
it must not be practicable to make adequate provision for the objector by some
other means.119

The meaning of ‘undue hardship’ was considered by Justice Murray in BJF.120
When considering criteria (f) and (g) Justice Murray relied upon decision of R v
Lake121 which considered the then recently enacted Crimes (Conﬁscation of
Proﬁts) Act 1985 (NSW). In this quotation Kirby P states that the hardship
provision:
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must not be so interpreted as to frustrate the achieving of the purpose of
Parliament in enacting the exceptional provisions of the Act. Something more than
ordinary hardship in the operation of the Act is therefore meant. Otherwise the Act
would have, within it, the seeds of its own ineffectiveness in every case.122

After considering this quote and the context of the CPCA, Justice Murray
concluded that ‘undue hardship’ is suffering that, ‘goes beyond what is warranted
and becomes excessive or disproportionate.’123 It must be a hardship that is
greater than the hardship that would ‘ordinarily flow from the confiscation’.124
Ultimately, Justice Murray concluded that although the loss of the family home
would be significant, it would not amount to undue hardship. If it was to amount
to undue hardship, the result would be that conﬁscation of the home of an
innocent party that was crime-used could never occur.125

In Stribrny,126 Ms Stribrna was deemed not to be an innocent party, meaning that
the criteria found in section 82(3)(b) was not met. Nevertheless, Justice Tottle did
consider if the hardship criteria found in section 82(3)(f) and (g) would be satisfied,
using the definition of undue hardship from BJF.127 Justice Tottle found that
although the confiscation would result in significant distress and hardship,
nevertheless it did not exceed the ordinary consequences that flow from the
confiscation of a family home. His Honour was not satisfied that the confiscation

122

BJF v The State of Western Australia (2011) 210 A Crim R 262, 271 [47], quoting R v Lake
(1989) 44 A Crim R 63, 66-7.
123
Ibid 271 [48].
124
Ibid 271 [49].
125
Ibid 273 [58]-[59].
126
[2015] WASC 396 (22 October 2015).
127
Ibid [73].

38

of the property would result in the plaintiffs getting divorced and Ms Stribrna and
her children needing to leave Australia in order to live with her family in the Czech
Republic.128 Although not explicitly stated by Justice Tottle, it is suggested that if
these circumstances existed, this would have constituted undue hardship.

Lamers129 provides further authority that dispossession alone cannot constitute
undue hardship. It is also notable as the case involved property confiscation on
the basis of a drug trafficker declaration being made, rather than due to the
property being crime-used. Despite this, the de facto partner of Mr Lamers, Ms
Willis, objected to the conﬁscation of the house under section 82(3). This was
based on section 82(2) which provides that, ‘If the court finds that the property is
crime-used, or is not required to decide whether the property is crime-used, the
court may make an order under subsection (3) or (4).’ As the court was not
required to determine if the property was crime-used, counsel for Ms Willis
argued that the court could make an order under subsection (3) or (4).130 This
submission was not accepted by Justice Templeman, who found that section 82
applies only to crime-used property, and section 82(2) refers to circumstances ‘in
which property is frozen on the ground that it is crime-used even though … the
court is not required to decide whether the property was actually crime-used.’131
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As there was no suggestion the property was crime-used, an objection could not
be made under section 82.132

D. Sections 82(7) and 83(5)
For crime-used and crime-derived property respectively, sections 82(7) and 83(5)
allow for a freezing notice or order to be set aside if the objector pays the State
the amount equal to the value of the property. Although these subsections do
operate as protections for the family home of an innocent party, it is unlikely that
an individual would have the financial means to be in a position to effectively buy
back their family home from the State.133 In addition, although these sections
protect the home, they do not protect the objector from the financial
consequences of the confiscation. As a result, these subsections will not be
considered in detail.

III.

OTHER BASES OF CONFISCATION134
A. Frozen Property

Section 84 is the only protection that applies to drug trafficker declarations,
unexplained wealth declarations, criminal benefits declarations and crime-used
property substitution declarations before the property is confiscated.135 As this
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section does not apply to crime-used and crime-derived confiscation, and the
innocent party definition only applies to crime-used and crime-derived
confiscation, this section does not mention innocent parties. Nevertheless, it is
still relevant to innocent parties as it allows for a freezing notice or order to be set
aside if the court finds it is more likely than not that the wrongdoer does not own
or effectively control the property, and has not at any time given it away. As
McLure P observed, ‘third party ownership interests in the same property will only
be frozen and confiscated if the respondent or accused controlled those interests
or had given them away.’136

Skead argues that all this section achieves is protection from a confiscation that
should have never occurred in the first place. If the wrongdoer does not own or
effectively control the property and has not given away the property, then the
freezing order should never have been granted to begin with.137 Although this is
true, it may also be overly simplistic, as due to the expansive definition of ‘owner’
contained in the CPCA, determining ownership is not necessarily a straightforward
matter. This is particularly apparent when there are part owners and ‘exotic’
forms of equitable interests involved, such as constructive and Quistclose
trusts.138 An example of this section being used with some success in relation to a
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drug trafficker declaration is found in Campana v Western Australia.139 Here, Mrs
Campana successfully protected her half share in the family home from
confiscation.140

It is important to stress that in relation to a drug trafficker declaration, that once
this declaration is actually made, any objections under section 84, or any other
section, become redundant.141 Section 84(2), which applies to drug trafficker
declarations, is only of assistance when a person ‘is or will be charged’. Once a
person is convicted it is no longer relevant.142

B. Confiscated Property
Section 87(1) applies to the release of confiscated property, as opposed to
property that is the subject of a freezing notice or order.143 Section 85(1) provides
that a person may apply for the release of property that has been confiscated
under section 6 or 7. This applies to property that has been confiscated for any
reason, except the property of a declared drug trafficker, which occurs under

139

[2008] WASC 230 (30 October 2008).
Ibid [61].
141
Edward Greaves, ‘Criminal Property Confiscation Act 2000: Drug Trafficker Cases’ (Paper
presented at Legalwise Seminar, 26 March 2015) 17.
142
Ibid.
143
For a summary of when property is treated as ‘confiscated’ under the CPCA see Alain
Musikanth, ‘The Criminal Property Confiscation Act: Acting on Behalf of a Commercial Client with
an Interest in the Asset’ (Paper presented at Continuing Professional Development on the Seizure
of Client’s Assets by the State, Law Society of Western Australia, 18 March 2009) 14-5.
140

42

section 8.144

This was confirmed in Centurion145 and Lamers where Justice

Templeman found the court had no jurisdiction, ‘to release property confiscated
under s 8 of the CPCA.’146

Section 87(1) provides the conditions that must be satisfied for the court to order
a release of any property under section 85.147 Section 87(3) operates in the same
manner as sections 82(5) and 83(3) to enable an objector to receive their share in
the property if condition (e) cannot be established. Conditions (a), (b), (d) and (e)
in section 87 essentially repeat the conditions found in 82(4) and 83(2). It is only
condition (c) which is novel to section 87. As was noted in Centurion, condition (c)
‘signiﬁcantly restricts the power of the court to make an order for the release of
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conﬁscated property.’148 Although this restriction is acknowledged, there is no
case law that illustrates the failure to fulfil condition (c) resulting in the failure of
an objection under section 87.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The family home of an innocent party can only be completely spared from
confiscation if the hardship provision contained in section 82(3) is satisfied. Due
to the strict interpretation of ‘undue hardship’, and that section 82(3) only applies
to crime-used property, the likelihood of this occurring is remote. If the hardship
provision is not satisfied, the protections can only operate to protect the interest
of the innocent party, not the home itself. As the case of McLeod indicates, the
fact that one is an innocent party is no guarantee that the objection will be
successful. The existence of other conditions beyond being an innocent party
means that a family home can be confiscated even if all the owners are innocent
parties.
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CHAPTER SIX: ISSUES ARISING FROM THE PROTECTIONS
I.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will critically consider a number of significant issues arising out of the
protections discussed in chapter five. These issues relate to the effective control
condition, the hardship protection, the lack of discretion afforded the court and
the scope of the innocent party definition. These issues are not an exhaustive list,
but an attempt to address the most significant issues emerging from the cases.

II.

EFFECTIVE CONTROL

The most significant issue that arises from sections 82(4) and 83(2) is the
requirement that the property is not effectively controlled by a person who made
criminal use of the property. This is highlighted by McLeod where in order to fulfil
the ‘innocent party’ condition, the son had to establish that he did not know or
have reasonable grounds for suspecting that the offence was being committed.149
Therefore, it assisted the son to establish a degree of separation from the
property, which he achieved successfully. However, this degree of separation
from the property played a large part in his failure to establish that his father did
not have effective control of the property.

The cases of McLeod and Stavrianakos share a number of factual similarities. Both
cases involved circumstances where the father committed drug offences on a
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property owned by innocent family members who did not reside on the
property.150

In Stavrianakos, the innocent parties were entitled to relief

proportionate to their share in the property.151 In McLeod, no relief was available
to the innocent party.152 The key difference was that in McLeod, the wrongdoer
was not the legal owner, while in Stavrianakos the wrongdoer was the legal owner.
Despite Mr Stavrianakos being both the legal owner and having effective control
as a matter of fact, he did not have effective control as defined by section 156(1).
In contrast, as the father in McLeod was not the legal owner, he could be found to
have effective control. The CPCA and other resources do not explain why a legal
owner cannot also be in effective control.

The explanatory notes to Criminal Property Confiscation Bill 2000 states in relation
to clause 82(4) that, ‘It would be unjust for the crime-used property to be
confiscated if all owners were innocent.’153 Yet this is precisely what occurred in
McLeod as the son was the sole owner of the property. Although it could have
been argued that the father had an equitable interest and was therefore an
‘owner’, this was not established.154 McLeod demonstrates that crime-used
property can be confiscated when the property is under the effective control of
the wrongdoer, even if all the owners are innocent parties. Ironically, the outcome
for the son in McLeod would have been better if his father were a joint legal owner,
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as in this case the son’s interest in the property would then have been protected,
as the father would not have then been in effective control. Although the house
would still have been confiscated, the son would have received an amount equal
to one half of the value of the property.

III.

THE HARDSHIP PROTECTION

The most obvious issue with the hardship protection is that it only applies to
property that is crime-used. In explaining why the hardship provision applied to
crime-used property and not crime-derived property, the Western Australian
Parliamentary Secretary noted that, ‘the intention of the Act is to ensure that no
person benefits from crime.’155 A spouse or a dependant, ‘should not have the
benefit of living in a house which has been derived from the commission of a
confiscation offence.’156 As a result, the CPCA intentionally ensures that no one,
even an innocent party, does not have the benefit of living in a house which has
been derived from the commission of a confiscation offence.157 As Greaves
succinctly explains, ‘property that is crime-derived must be confiscated, and that
[sic] if that causes hardship to third parties, too bad. Crime should not pay.’ 158 It
is likely that this same explanation also extends to confiscation resulting from drug
trafficking, unexplained wealth and criminal benefits.159 With this explanation in
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mind, the exclusion of property confiscated as a result of a crime-used property
substitution declaration from the benefit of the hardship provision is perplexing.
No explanation is provided in the CPCA or by Parliament.

An example of these difficulties is found in Western Australia v Bowers,160 where
Mr Bowers had pleaded guilty to three counts of sexual offences against a child.161
As the offences occurred at a home owned by the victim’s father, this property
could not be confiscated. As a result, a substitution order was issued and Mr
Bowers was required to account for the full value of the property pursuant to a
substitution declaration. The Director of Public Prosecutions (‘DPP’) also obtained
a freezing order under section 43(3)(c) of the CPCA over Mr Bowers’ interest in his
matrimonial home in Bassendean.162 Justice Templeman set aside the freezing
order on the basis that Mr Bowers had not made criminal use of the property
owned by the victim’s father,163 and even if he had, the hardship provision was
satisfied by Mrs Bowers.164 This decision was overturned on appeal by the DPP in
Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) v Bowers. McLure P, Owen and Buss JJA found
that Mr Bowers had made criminal use of the property165 and that the hardship
provision only applied to crime-used property, not property used as security for
crime-used property substitution declaration proceedings.166 As a result, Mrs
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Bowers and her children were denied relief because Mr Bowers’ offence was not
committed at his home, but at a home belonging to someone else.167

IV.

LACK OF DISCRETION

One feature of the CPCA is the lack of discretion that the court is afforded
regarding confiscation orders.168 This is perhaps most evident in relation to drug
trafficker confiscations. The court has no discretion in making a drug trafficker
declaration169 and no discretion in declaring that all the property of the drug
trafficker is confiscated.170 Section 84(2) provides the only avenue for relief for
innocent parties when property is frozen as a result of a drug trafficking
declaration. Consequently, the only objection that can be successfully made is
that the frozen property is not owned or effectively controlled by the wrongdoer
and the property has not been given away by the wrongdoer.171 No discretion is
afforded in regard to factors such as innocence, hardship or proportionality.

It was explicitly observed in Whittle v Western Australia that in relation to drug
trafficker declarations the CPCA simply does not allow for considerations of
‘whether a confiscation is fair or just, and whether that confiscation will give rise
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to hardship.’172 Here, the family home was confiscated as Ms Whittle was declared
a drug trafficker. The objection against confiscation made by the children failed
as the drug trafficker declaration had already been made. It was submitted by the
next friend for the son of Ms Whittle that the children were worse off than if their
mother had committed murder.173 He also observed the children would have
fulfilled the protections available for crime-used and crime-derived property.174
However, Allanson J found that, ‘general arguments relating to fairness and
justice, are not supported by the text of the legislation.’175

Likewise, in Tran v The State of Western Australia the ‘difficulties in the life of the
plaintiff and members of his family’176 could not be considered in relation to drug
trafficker confiscations. Mr Tran was a refugee from Vietnam.177 He lived in his
family home with his wife and daughter for four years, before leaving to live with
his girlfriend.178 At this time he signed a statutory declaration which he believed
divested him of his interest in the family home. However, Martino J found this
declaration was not effective and that even if it was, the transfer would have been
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a gift and therefore, the home would still have been confiscated.179 As no
discretion was available, the order for confiscation had to be made.180

V.

INNOCENT PARTY DEFINITION

As section 87(1) mirrors the provisions in sections 82(4) and 83(2), the same issue
regarding effective control arises. However, an additional issue does arise in
section 87(1) in relation to innocent parties. As has been noted, section 87 applies
to property that has been confiscated for any reason,181 except property of a
declared drug trafficker. The problem that arises is that the definition of innocent
party in section 153 of the CPCA only applies to crime-used and crime-derived
property,182 yet sections 87(1)(d) and (e) both require the innocent party
definition to be satisfied. Further, section 87(1)(b) refers to effective control, but
only in relation to property that is crime-used or crime-derived.183

Skead

speculates that either the failure to include any reference to the other confiscation
bases is deliberate so that the process for obtaining the release of property is far
easier, or the more likely scenario that the failure to include the other confiscation
bases in the definitions is a drafting oversight.184 This oversight leaves the
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application of section 87 to these bases unclear.185 In the present state of
ambiguity, the correct principle of construction would be to interpret section 87,
‘so as to respect a person’s property rights’.186 As noted by Cole JA, ‘Unless no
other interpretation is possible, justice requires that statutes should not be
construed so as to enable the confiscation of an individual's property without
payment of just compensation.’187

VI.

CONCLUSION

The protections contained in the CPCA give rise to a number of issues. Amongst
the most obvious and significant in relation to a family home are the effective
control criteria contained in sections 82(4)(b), 83(2)(b) and 87(1)(b) and the
exclusion of property confiscated as a result of a crime-used property substitution
declaration from the hardship protections. The lack of discretion afforded the
court, particularly in relation to section 84, is problematic as the protections can
only apply if the property is not owned or effectively controlled by the wrongdoer
and the property has not been given away by the wrongdoer. There is no scope
for the court to consider hardship, innocence or proportionality. The protection
for confiscated property is also problematic, as conditions (b) and (d) of section
87(1) can only be fulfilled if the property is crime-used or crime-derived. How
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these conditions apply to confiscation resulting from unexplained wealth, criminal
benefits and crime-used property substitution declarations is unknown.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: RECOMMENDATIONS
I.

INTRODUCTION

A number of issues relating to the protections for innocent parties contained in
the CPCA have been observed. This chapter makes recommendations to address
these issues with the aim of improving the protections available to innocent
parties whose family home is confiscated or subject to confiscation. These
recommendations seek to improve the consistency and clarity of the protections,
without undermining the purpose of the CPCA.

II.

EFFECTIVE CONTROL

The first recommendation is to alter the application of the effective control
condition found in sections 82(4)(b), 83(2)(b), 84(1), 84(2) and 87(1)(b). As the
comparison of McLeod and Stavrianakos illustrates, the effective control condition
can result in a significant disparity in outcome, with no justifiable reasoning. As a
determination that effective control exists effectively means that the wrongdoer
was a de facto owner of the property, it is appropriate that an innocent party is
protected in the same manner as if the wrongdoer was an owner. Therefore, the
effective control condition should be amended so that the innocent party would
be entitled to a proportionate share in the property. For example, in McLeod if
the father had been a non-innocent owner, the son would have been entitled to
half of the value of the property, rather than receiving no protection at all.
Applying the effective control condition in this manner would ensure that an
innocent party is protected consistently, regardless of whether the wrongdoer has
54

a legal estate in the property or not. This amendment would not undermine the
intention of the CPCA, rather it would simply ensure that the innocent owner is
protected in a consistent manner.

Any argument that this amendment would lead to individuals seeking to avoid
confiscation by registering property in the name of another person is without
foundation.

Only a proportion of the property would be exempt from

confiscation, and as such it is no more open to abuse than the current possibility
of having multiple legal owners of a property to reduce the proportion of the
property that is confiscated. The possibility of avoiding confiscation in this manner
is further reduced by the fact that a person is not an innocent party if that person
acquired the property with the intention of avoiding the operation of the CPCA.188

Additionally, in appropriate cases the court has been willing to find the existence
of a trust in relation to property, which enables the property to be confiscated
despite the wrongdoer not being the legal owner. An example of this is found in
the case of Curran v The State of Western Australia (No 2)189 where the parents of
a declared drug trafficker were found to be holding the property on constructive
trust for the drug trafficker. As a result, the drug trafficker was determined to be
the owner of the property and the property was confiscated.190 Despite the drug
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trafficker not being the legal owner, as the property was being held on trust for
him, the confiscation was appropriate.191

Amending the application of the

effective control condition as discussed would have no impact on this outcome.

Finally, in relation to crime-used property, the effective control definition should
be applied cautiously. Unlike the other bases of confiscation, if effective control
does not exist, a confiscation order may still be made. For crime-used property, a
substitution order can be made when the wrongdoer does not own or have
effective control of the crime-used property.192 As a result, in situations where
there is any doubt about the existence of effective control, it is preferable for
effective control to be found not to exist, and for a substitution order to be made.
This approach ensures an innocent owner’s home is not confiscated incorrectly.
This would be an ideal outcome in cases like McLeod, as it protects the property
rights of the innocent party, without frustrating the intention of the CPCA.

The effective control condition should be amended so that if the wrongdoer is
found to have effective control, the outcome for the innocent party would be the
same as if the wrongdoer were a ‘non-innocent’ owner. This amendment would
remove the discrepancy in protection provided to the innocent parties evident in
McLeod and Stavrianakos. Again, the amendment would not undermine the
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intention of the CPCA, but would ensure an innocent party has some protection
regardless of whether the wrongdoer is the legal owner or not.

Ideally a

substitution mechanism, like the mechanism for crime-used property, would exist
for all types of confiscation. Such a mechanism would enable the effective control
condition to be removed altogether, as a substitution order could be made against
the wrongdoer, which would protect the innocent owner. As this mechanism does
not exist, the proposed amendment is the preferred solution, as it provides
consistency and some protection for innocent owners. However, in relation to
crime-used property, a substitution order should be ordered where possible to
protect the innocent owner.

III.

THE HARDSHIP PROTECTION

The hardship provision is severely limited by the fact that only a spouse, de facto
partner or a dependant of an owner of the property who is usually resident at the
property and is either an innocent party or less than 18 years old can object.
Added to this is the requirement that the objector must suffer undue hardship,
meaning that the hardship must go beyond the hardship ordinarily resulting from
the confiscation of a family home.193 The cases in this area, such as Stribrny,
demonstrate how difficult it is to meet the conditions required for a successful
objection under section 82(3). These limitations, although harsh, are appropriate
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since, ‘otherwise the Act, would have, within it, the seeds of its own
ineffectiveness in every case.’194

The problem with the hardship provision is not the strictness of its application, but
that it does not apply to confiscation resulting from crime-used property
substitution. In relation to crime-derived property, unexplained wealth and
criminal benefits, this is justified by parliament’s intention that ‘no person should
benefit from crime.’195 Although not explicitly articulated, it is a reasonable
assumption given the purpose of the CPCA, that drug trafficker confiscations are
excluded from the hardship provision as a further deterrent for this activity.
However, there is no justification for the hardship provision not to apply to crimeused property substitution, as the case of Bowers illustrates. Due purely to the
fact that Mr Bowers’ offence was not committed at his home, but at a home
belonging to someone else, Mrs Bowers and her children were unable to access
the hardship protection. This outcome is unjust, as rather than the punishment
fitting the crime, the punishment was determined by where the offence took
place.196
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As confirmed by the High Court decision in White,197 when it comes to
confiscation, any property that is determined to be crime-used can lead to a
substitution order being made.

However, when it comes to the objection

provisions, a distinction between crime-used property and property subject to a
crime-used substitution order is maintained. This was noted by Templeman J in
the first instance judgment in Bowers who found, ‘where s 82 refers to crime-used
property, the legislature must have intended it to apply also to property which is
substituted for crime-used property, thereby avoiding what would otherwise be
an unjust result’.198 The Court of Appeal disagreed, upholding the DPP’s appeal
and stating ‘there is no proper basis to conclude that the legislature intended that
s 82(3)’ applied to substituted property.199 This is ‘an extremely unjust result’200
that can only be explained by drafting oversight. The CPCA should be amended to
ensure that all crime-used property confiscation, both direct and by a substitution
declaration, are subject to the hardship protection.

IV.

AFFORD GREATER DISCRETION TO THE COURT

Although these specific recommendations would result in the injustices evident in
McLeod and Bowers being avoided in the future, these injustices could arguably
have been prevented if the court had been afforded greater judicial discretion.
Given the significant impact that can result from property confiscation it is an
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appropriate safeguard, particularly in relation to innocent parties, for the courts
to be, ‘vested with a discretion to consider the ramifications of the confiscation
and vary orders made.’201

An example of a situation where this discretion would be appropriate is in drug
trafficker confiscation. Under the Misuse of Drug Act 1981 (WA) (‘MDA’) a person
is declared to be a drug trafficker based on either a single offence that exceeds an
amount listed in Schedule 7 or 8, or by being convicted of three or more serious
drug offences within ten years.202 Under Schedule 8 of the MDA, the number of
cannabis plants for the purposes of drug trafficking is twenty. Cases such as
McLeod, BJF and Stribrny, demonstrate that when property is used for drug related
offences but the criteria for a drug trafficker declaration are not satisfied, the
property will be confiscated as crime-used.203

As a crime-used property

confiscation, an innocent party could object under section 82(4) and the hardship
provision, section 82(3). However, if the property had been used to grow twenty
or more cannabis plants, an innocent party could only object under section 84(2).
It is difficult to see any reasonable explanation as to why an innocent party can
have the benefit of a hardship provision when the party’s spouse has cultivated
seventeen cannabis plants (as in BJF), but if three more plants had been cultivated,
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the hardship provision would not apply. Affording the court some discretion
would be valuable in such a circumstance. This is in keeping with the purpose of
the CPCA, since one of the reasons the hardship provision was included in the
CPCA was to protect innocent spouses and dependents when the family home is
used for hydroponic drug cultivation.204

Additionally, as a result of the operation of section 159(2)(e) and section 160, a
person can be taken to be a declared drug trafficker when a person is charged and
then absconds or dies before the charge is disposed of or finally determined. As
Skead notes, this results in the concerning potential for all of a deceased person’s
property to be conﬁscated if the deceased was charged with a drug-related
offence, a warrant of arrest was issued, and the deceased died before the matter
was ﬁnally resolved.205 In this situation, it would again be beneficial for the court
to have some discretion in protecting an innocent party, such as the partner of the
deceased. In addition to these hypothetical situations, cases such as Whittle and
Tran demonstrate other factual situations where providing some judicial
discretion would be valuable in ensuring the protection are applied appropriately.
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The Commonwealth equivalent of the CPCA, the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth)
(‘PoCA’) does enable the court to retain discretion in some circumstances. For
example, forfeiture of crime-used property is always discretionary, despite there
being generally no discretion in relation to crime-derived property.206 In relation
to crime-used property, section 48(3) PoCA allows the court to consider any
hardship that may be caused, the ordinary use of the property and the gravity of
the offence or offences when considering a forfeiture order. It also allows the
discretion to consider the public interest in a number of circumstances. 207

It is evident that the CPCA was drafted in such a way to ensure the confiscation
powers have a very wide scope and application. The Explanatory Notes contains
numerous comments that a definition is defined broadly to ensure the effective
operation of the CPCA.208 This scope was observed during the parliamentary
debates surrounding the CPCA, where it was remarked that the CPCA ‘is cast more
widely than the evil to which it is directed.’209 As a result, some judicial discretion
is appropriate to protect innocent parties caught in the expansive net of
confiscation powers contained in the CPCA. The introduction of ‘a guided judicial
discretion’ into the CPCA, that allows ‘the courts to take into account
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considerations of proportionality, hardship and public interest is desirable.’210 This
is true generally, but is particularly so when a confiscation impacts upon the family
home of an innocent party.

V.

CLARIFY THE SCOPE OF THE INNOCENT PARTY DEFINITION

The final issue relates to the protection contained in section 87. As has been
noted, the definition of innocent party in section 153 of the CPCA only applies to
crime-used and crime-derived property,211 yet sections 87(1)(d) and (e) both
require the innocent party definition to be satisfied. Further, section 87(1)(b)
refers to effective control, but only in relation to property that is crime-used or
crime-derived.212 As section 87 applies to property that has been confiscated for
all reasons,213 except property of a declared drug trafficker, it is appropriate to
amend the innocent party definition to ensure that innocent parties in relation to
unexplained wealth, criminal benefits and crime-used property substitution are
included in this protection.
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Although section 87 does not apply to drug trafficker confiscation, the expansion
of the innocent party definition should also relate to drug trafficker confiscation.
If this is done, then the innocent party condition can be included in sections 84(1)
and 84(2), resulting in consistency across all of the protections. As the CPCA
currently stands the only requirements for a successful objection under section 84
is that the individual establishes ownership and that the wrongdoer does not
control that ownership or had not given away that ownership. Unlike the crimeused and crime-derived protections, the ‘innocence’ of the owner is not
considered, which makes a successful objection easier to obtain.

This is

particularly unusual given the intention of the CPCA was to target unexplained
wealth and the drug trade.214

VI.

CONCLUSION

Significant improvements could be made to the protections contained in the CPCA
as a result of some minor changes. The four recommendations made in this
chapter, amending the effective control provision, expanding the hardship
provision to include crime-used property substitution orders, the introduction of
a guided judicial discretion, and amending the innocent party definition to cover
all bases of confiscation, would improve the consistency and clarity of these
protections, while remaining consistent with the intended purpose of the CPCA.

214

Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 29 June 2000, 8611 (Dan
Barron-Sullivan).

64

CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION
A person can only be an ‘innocent party’ as defined by the CPCA if the confiscation
is in relation to crime-used and crime-derived property. To be ‘innocent’ the
individual must not have known and had no reasonable grounds for suspecting
that the confiscation offence was being or would be committed. If a person
satisfies this definition, the only way that the family home can be completely
protected from confiscation is if the hardship provision contained in section 82(3)
of the CPCA is satisfied. This provision is only available to crime-used property.
There are a number of criteria that must be satisfied, but critically the objector
must be an innocent spouse, de facto or dependent of the owner, and must be
able to demonstrate that the confiscation would result in suffering that is greater
than the hardship that would ‘ordinarily flow from the confiscation’. 215 If the
hardship provision is not applicable, then an innocent party is only able to protect
that party’s interest in the family home. This means that the home is still
confiscated and sold, but after the sale the innocent party is paid an amount equal
to the value of that interest.216

In relation to crime-used and crime-derived property, the interest of an innocent
party can be protected by establishing innocence, ownership and that the
property is not effectively controlled by the person who committed the offence.217
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If the confiscation does not relate to crime-used or crime-derived property, the
objector must establish that wrongdoer does not own or effectively control the
property, and has not at any time given it away. There is no requirement that the
objector be an innocent party.218 Finally, for all types of confiscation except drug
trafficker confiscation, an objection can be made for release of the confiscated
property provided the objector is an innocent party, an owner of the property, the
property is not effectively controlled by the wrongdoer and the objector is not
aware the property was liable for confiscation, and could not reasonably have
been expected to become aware, until after the confiscation took place.219

Cases such as McLeod and Bowers are instructive in demonstrating the injustice
that can result under the current operation of the protections. In order to improve
the protections and ensure that they operate in a consistent and equitable
manner, it is suggested that the effective control condition is amended, the
hardship provision is expanded to include crime-used property substitution
orders, some guided judicial discretion is introduced, and the innocent party
definition is amended to include all bases of confiscation. Such amendments
would not defeat the intention of the CPCA, but would ensure that the protections
that currently exist are effective in protecting the property of innocent owners.
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This thesis has provided an overview of the extent a family home of an innocent
party is protected by the CPCA. This overview has revealed the protections to be
severely limited. There are a number of circumstances in which the home of an
innocent person can be confiscated. Even with the amendments proposed by this
thesis, the protections would still be limited to very specific circumstances, in
keeping with the object of the CPCA. Although the application of the protections
may still be harsh in some circumstances, such as the hardship protection, the
protections will be significantly easier to construe and apply. This thesis has not
attempted to radically alter the scope of the protections, merely to ensure that
what currently exists is coherent and consistent. As the protections currently
stand they could aptly be described as ‘perplexing and difficult to construe’ and
‘extreme’.220 When it comes to an innocent person attempting to protect their
family home, this is a completely unacceptable situation that requires
rectification.
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APPENDIX A: SUMMARY OF PROTECTIONS FOR INNOCENT PARTIES
TABLE 1: CRIME-USED AND CRIME-DERIVED PROTECTIONS
I.

83(2) Crime-Derived

(a) the objector is the owner of the property, or is one of 2 or more owners of the property
(b) the property is not effectively controlled by a person who wholly or partly derived or realised the
property, directly or indirectly, from the commission of a confiscation offence.
(c) the objector is an innocent party in relation to the property
(d) each other owner (if there are more than one) is an innocent party in relation to the property

Section Type of Confiscation
Conditions
82(4) Crime-Used
(a) the objector is the owner of the property, or is one of 2 or more owners of the property
(b) the property is not effectively controlled by a person who made criminal use of the property
(c) the objector is an innocent party in relation to the property
(d) each other owner (if there are more than one) is an innocent party in relation to the property

82(3) Crime-Used

(a) the objector is the spouse, a de facto partner or a dependant of an owner of the property
(b) the objector is an innocent party, or is less than 18 years old
(c) the objector was usually resident on the property at the time the relevant confiscation offence
was committed, or is most likely to have been committed
(d) the objector was usually resident on the property at the time the objection was filed
(e) the objector has no other residence at the time of hearing the objection
(f) the objector would suffer undue hardship if the property is confiscated
(g) it is not practicable to make adequate provision for the objector by some other means.
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TABLE 2: PROTECTIONS FROM OTHER TYPES OF CONFISCATION
II.

Section Type of Confiscation
Conditions
84(1) Unexplained Wealth Does not own or effectively control the property
Criminal Benefits
Has not given the property away
Crime-Used Property
Substitution
84(2) Drug Trafficker

Does not own or effectively control the property
Has not given the property away

87(1) Crime-Used
Applies to confiscated property only
(a) immediately before the confiscation of the property, the applicant owned the property, or was
Crime-Derived
one of 2 or more owners of the property
(b) the property is not effectively controlled by a person who made criminal use of the property, or
by a person who wholly or partly derived or realised the property, directly or indirectly, from the
Unexplained Wealth commission of a confiscation offence
(c) the applicant did not become aware, and can not reasonably be expected to have become aware,
until after the property was confiscated, that the property was liable to confiscation under section 6
Criminal Benefits
or 7
Crime-Used Property
(d) the applicant is or was an innocent party in relation to the property
Substitution

(e) each other owner (if there are more than one) is or was an innocent party in relation to the
property
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TABLE 3: PROTECTIONS BY TYPE OF CONFISCATION
III.

Applicant was an innocent owner before the confiscation, property not effectively controlled by wrongdoer, applicant was not aware property was going to be confiscated, each other owner is an innocent party

The wrong-doer does not own or effectively control the property and has not given the property away

Overview
Type of Confiscation Section
Applicant is an innocent owner, property not effectively controlled by wrong-doer, each other owner is an
82(4) innocent party
Crime-Used
82(3) Hardship Provision- only available to spouse, de facto or dependant of an owner of the property
Applicant was an innocent owner before the confiscation, property not effectively controlled by wrong87(1) doer, applicant was not aware property was going to be confiscated, each other owner is an innocent party
Applicant is an innocent owner, property not effectively controlled by wrong-doer, each other owner is an
83(2) innocent party
Crime-Derived
Applicant was an innocent owner before the confiscation, property not effectively controlled by wrong87(1) doer, applicant was not aware property was going to be confiscated, each other owner is an innocent party
84(2) The wrong-doer does not own or effectively control the property and has not given the property away
Drug Trafficker
Unexplained Wealth 84(1) The wrong-doer does not own or effectively control the property and has not given the property away
Applicant was an innocent owner before the confiscation, property not effectively controlled by wrong87(1) doer, applicant was not aware property was going to be confiscated, each other owner is an innocent party
84(1) The wrong-doer does not own or effectively control the property and has not given the property away
Criminal Benefits
Applicant was an innocent owner before the confiscation, property not effectively controlled by wrongdoer, applicant was not aware property was going to be confiscated, each other owner is an innocent party
87(1)
Crime-Used Property
84(1)
Substitution

87(1)
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